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CLA YCO PETROLEUM CORP. v. OCCIDENTAL
PETROLEUM CORP.: SHOULD THERE BE A
BRIBERY EXCEPTION TO THE ACT
OF STATE DOCTRINE?
INTRODUCTION
The act of state doctrine' has precluded judicial review of the
validity of the acts of a foreign sovereign since 1897.2 Nevertheless,
the courts apply the doctrine flexibly. This flexible application has
generated much confusion and afforded little guidance in determining
whether a particular activity falls within the doctrine's protection.3
As a result, the status of bribes to foreign officials under the doctrine is
unclear. This Note argues that there should be an exception to the act
of state doctrine when a previous Foreign Corrupt Practices Act inves-
tigation has found that an American multinational corporation has
bribed a foreign government official with the intent to retain or obtain
business for that corporation. 4
Section I of this Note discusses the act of state doctrine and the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA),5 which prohibits U.S.
domestic concerns from bribing foreign government officials for the
purpose of retaining or obtaining business.6 Section II presents Clayco
Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,7 in which the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the act of state
doctrine barred an antitrust suit against an American oil company
that allegedly made illegal payments to a foreign government official
1. The act of state doctrine bars judicial review of the acts of a foreign government
within that government's own territory. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250,252 (1897).
See infra notes 10-21 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
3. See generally J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSl-
NESS ABROAD §§ 8.03-8.13 (2d ed. 1981), for a discussion of the act of state doctrine in
antitrust litigation.
4. But see id. at § 8.09, 251-52, 252 n.88. Atwood and Brewster argue that there
should not be a bribery exception to the act of state doctrine. Their argument, however,
does not address the viability of such an exception when there has been an FCPA investiga-
tion that links the bribe to the foreign sovereign's act. See infra notes 80-118 and accompa-
nying text.
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-2 (1982). See infra notes 10-44 and accompanying
text.
6. Id. See infra note 34.
7. 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984). See infra notes
45-67 and accompanying text.
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to obtain an off-shore oil concession. Noting the absence of a full
investigation under the FCPA, the court rejected Clayco's assertion
that the FCPA abrogated the act of state doctrine. 8 Section III of the
Note evaluates the Clayco decision and proposes an exception to the
act of state doctrine when an FCPA investigation establishes a link
between an illegal payment and a foreign act of state.9
I
BACKGROUND
A. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The United States Supreme Court first announced the act of state
doctrine in 1897 in Underhill v. Hernandez:'0
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sov-
ereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts
of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of griev-
ances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be
availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves. 11
It was not until 1964, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,'2
that the Court elaborated upon the doctrine, explained how it should
be applied, and discussed the policies supporting its application. 13 The
8. 712 F.2d at 409. See infra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 68-118 and accompanying text.
10. 168 U.S. 250 (1897) (suit by an American citizen against a foreign official for
unlawful detention and harassment by army troops barred by the act of state doctrine).
11. Id. at 252. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 41 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS] ("[A] court in the United States. . .will refrain from examining
the validity of an act of a foreign state by which that state has exercised its jurisdiction to
give effect to its public interests."). An example of an act of state is the expropriation of
private property by a foreign government in furtherance of that nation's public interest.
See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). An action which would
not be considered an act of state is embezzlement by a foreign official for his personal
benefit. See Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied sub nom.
Jimenez v. Hixon, 373 U.S. 914 (1963).
12. 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (suit to recover the proceeds of property expropriated by a
foreign government barred by the act of state doctrine despite allegation that the expropria-
tion may have violated international law). For a detailed discussion of the Sabbatino deci-
sion, see Falk, The Complexity of Sabbatino, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 935 (1964). For other
instances in which the Supreme Court applied the act of state doctrine, see American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (antitrust suit); Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) (replevin action over title to consignments); Ricaud v.
American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918) (dispute over title to consignment); United States
v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (dissolution of a corporation by a foreign sovereign);
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (nationalization of industry and consequent
dismissal of corporation's debts by a foreign sovereign). See also J. ATWOOD & K. BREW-
STER, supra note 3, at §§ 8.03-8.13, for a full discussion of the act of state doctrine in an
antitrust context.
13. See RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(REVISED) § 428 reporters' note 2 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1983) [hereinafter cited as RESTATE-
MENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (REVISED)] ("The modem American formulation of the
act of state doctrine stems from Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), but the
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Court declared that neither the language of the Constitution nor the
inherent nature of sovereignty nor principles of international law
requires application of the act of state doctrine. 14 The Court, how-
ever, stated that the doctrine has "constitutional underpinnings" inso-
far as it arises from the basic relationship between the executive and
judicial branches of government in a system of separation of powers. 15
Based on established precedent, the Court reasoned that the judici-
ary's "passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather
than further this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the
community of nations as a whole." 16 While the Court did not articu-
late a specific test, the Sabbatino opinion alluded to several factors that
are relevant to whether judicial review of a foreign act of state is
appropriate. 17 These factors include possible impairment of the Exec-
utive's conduct of foreign affairs,' 8 the degree of consensus in interna-
tional law on the act in question, the existence of standards in a treaty
or other agreement, the continued existence and recognition by the
United States of the foreign government, 19 the sensitivity of the issues
to national concerns, 20 and the singular ability of the executive branch
doctrine was reexamined and reformulated in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 (1964) . . ").
14. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421, 423 (1964).
15. Id. at 423.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 428-31. See infra notes 97-115 and accompanying text.
18. This factor was not expressly enumerated in the opinion but was implied in the
Court's discussion of the separation of powers doctrine. Id. at 423-24. See supra text
accompanying notes 15-16. Justice Brennan recognized the possible impairment in the
conduct of foreign affairs as a factor in his summary of Sabbatino for his dissent in First
Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 787-88 (1972).
19. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. This factor appears to have a greater impact on the
applicability of the act of state doctrine when the foreign government is no longer in exist-
ence or not recognized by the U.S. See, e.g., id. ("The balance of relevant considerations
may also be shifted if the government which perpetrated the challenged act of state is no
longer in existence, as in the Bernstein case, for the political interest of this country may, as
a result, be measurably altered."). See also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS, supra note 11, at § 42 ("The [act of state doctrine] does not apply in the case of an
act by a regime that: (a) is not recognized as the government of the acting state by the
United States at the time the court determines whether to examine the validity of the act
There is no evidence, however, that the existence of the foreign government and its rec-
ognition by the U.S. is a critical factor in applying the act of state doctrine. In Sabbatino,
the Court focused on the international consensus factor. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428-31.
The existence of the foreign government was addressed only because of the particular cir-
cumstances in Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.
1954), which involved actions of Nazi Germany.
20. This reference to national concerns apparently includes concerns of both the
United States and the foreign nation, such as the national interests of capital importing
countries as compared with those of capital exporting countries, or the social ideology of
nations exhibiting state control over the means of production as compared with that of
nations with free enterprise economies. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 429-30.
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to compensate U.S. citizens harmed by the act of a foreign state.2'
B. THE BERNSTEIN EXCEPTION
Scholars22 and courts23 argue that the act of state doctrine is
inapplicable when the executive branch waives any objection to judi-
cial scrutiny of the validity of the act of a foreign state. This is known
as the "Bernstein exception," derived from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit's opinion in Bernstein v. N. V Neder-
landsche-Amerikaansche.24 In Bernstein, the owner of stock in a Ger-
man liability company sought to recover proceeds from a Dutch
corporation that converted this stock in a plan with Nazi officials.2 5
In a prior appeal of the case, the court had ordered the plaintiff to
refrain from alleging matters that would require the court to judge the
validity of acts of Nazi officials. 2 6 After the first decision, the Depart-
ment of State issued a press release in which it declared that the policy
of the executive branch was to "relieve American courts from any
restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the valid-
ity of the acts of Nazi officials." '27 Based on this expression of execu-
tive policy, the Second Circuit modified its prior decision, allowing the
21. Id at 428-31. The Sabbatino Court, applying these factors, found that the act of
state doctrine barred plaintiff's claim based upon the likelihood of judicial interference in
the conduct of foreign affairs because the executive branch had not indicated its position on
the expropriation issue; the division of international opinion on the question of a state's
power to expropriate an alien's property; the lack of relevant standards in any international
agreement; the appropriateness of diplomatic negotiation between the executive branch and
the foreign government as the means of settling the claim; and U.S. recognition of Cuba.
Id. at 428-34.
22. See, eg,, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 11, at
§ 41 comment h ("The considerations underlying the act of state doctrine do not call for its
application where it is clear that the executive branch of the government does not consider
inquiry into the act of the foreign states inimical to its conduct of foreign relations. When a
court in the United States is assured that possible rejection of a foreign act of state will not
embarrass foreign policy and when that assurance comes from the branch of government
responsible for the conduct of foreign relations, there would appear to be no reason for the
court to abstain from ruling on the merits."). Cf RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
(REVIsED), supra note 13, at § 428 comment d & reporters' note 6 ("If the State Depart-
ment issues a letter stating that it has no objection on foreign relations grounds to adjudica-
tion of the validity of a given act of a foreign state, U.S. courts will make their own
determination as to whether to apply the act of state doctrine, taking the view of the Execu-
tive Branch into account but not being bound by it.").
23. See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954);
First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). See infra notes 24-
32 and accompanying text.
24. 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). For a brief discussion of the Bernstein case and excep-
tion, see Note, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 50, 286 & n.14 (1972).
25. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amierikaansche, 173 F.2d 71, 72-73 (2d Cir.
1949), modified, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
26. Id. at 76.
27. Bernstein, 210 F.2d at 376 (quoting Department of State press release). This writ-
ten expression of executive branch policy is known as a "Bernstein letter."
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lower court to pass on the act of state in question.28
A plurality of the Supreme Court adopted the Bernstein exception
in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba.29 The
Supreme Court held that the act of state doctrine did not apply to a
counterclaim for excess pledged collateral as an offset against the value
of property expropriated by the Cuban Government without compen-
sation.30 The petitioner requested the Court to review the validity of
the expropriation. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, con-
cluded that a "waiver" by the executive branch would free the courts
from act of state concerns.31
The plurality in First National City Bank applied the Bernstein
exception because the Legal Adviser of the Department of State had
sent a letter to the Supreme Court advising that "the act of state doc-
trine should not be applied to bar consideration of a defendant's coun-
terclaim or set-off against the Government of Cuba in this or like
cases."' 32 This freed the Court to hear the claim, otherwise barred by
the act of state doctrine, on its merits. A majority of the Supreme
Court has yet to adopt the Bernstein exception.
C. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 197733 prohibits domestic
concerns from making payments to foreign officials for the purpose of
retaining or obtaining business. 34 The FCPA was passed in response
28. Id.
29. 406 U.S. 759 (1972). For a detailed description of First National City Bank, see
Leigh, The Supreme Court and the Sabbatino Watchers: First National City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 33 (1972).
30. 406 U.S. at 768, 772 (Douglas, J., concurring), 774 (Powell, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 762-70. See infra text accompanying note 32. Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tice White joined in this opinion. Justice Douglas' concurrence relied on a precedent unre-
lated to the act of state doctrine. Id at 770-73. Justice Powell's concurrence applied the
factors, but not the holding, of Sabbatino and concluded that the act of state doctrine did
not apply. Id. at 773-76. Justice Brennan's dissent, in which Justices Stewart, Marshall,
and Blackmun joined, concluded that the factors and holding of Sabbatino controlled.
Id. at 776-96. The dissent and both concurrences rejected the plurality's waiver theory. Ia
at 772-773 (Douglas, J., concurring), 773 (Powell, J., concurring), 777 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
32. First Nat'l City Bank, 406 U.S. at 764. The plurality also emphasized the exclusiv-
ity of the executive branch's control of foreign relations, as enumerated in Sabbatino. Id. at
767-68.
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-2 (1982). For a discussion of the legislative history of
the FCPA, see Note, A Congressional Response to the Problem of Questionable Corporate
Payments Abroad: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 10 L. & PoL'Y INT'L. Bus.
1253, 1253-59 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, A Congressional Response].
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(1).
(a) Prohibited Practices. It shall be unlawful for any domestic concern, other than
an issuer which is subject to section 78dd-1 of this title, or any officer, director,
employee, or agent of such domestic concern or any stockholder thereof acting on
behalf of such domestic concern, to make use of the mails or any means or instru-
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to the disclosure of overseas payments by more than four hundred
U.S. corporations, totalling in excess of $300 million. 35 Congress
sought to redress several problems in the area of corrupt foreign pay-
ments. First, the United States was blamed frequently for the acts of
American corporations. This damaged relations with major industrial
nations, where the disclosure of corrupt payments caused embarrass-
ment.36 Second, these activities spread corruption in friendly govern-
ments and promoted disrespect among their citizens. Third, such
payments may mislead consumers, because increased sale prices reflect
illicit payments rather than the quality of the product. Finally, Con-
gress feared low regard for American businessmen abroad.37
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Depart-
ment of Justice enforce the FCPA.38 The SEC has the authority to
investigate alleged violations 39 by companies within its jurisdiction.40
Its only remedy, however, is civil injunction.41 Upon accumulating
sufficient evidence to maintain a criminal action, the SEC refers the
case to the Department of Justice,42 which has exclusive criminal
jurisdiction over domestic businesses that are covered under the
FCPA.43 Additionally, the Department of Justice may bring suit for a
mentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment,
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, prom-
ise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to-
(1) any foreign official for purposes of-
(A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official
capacity, including a decision to fail to perform his official functions; or
(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign govern-
ment or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of
such government or instrumentality,
in order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining business for or
with, or directing business to, any person ....
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a). The Act also prohibits contributions to political parties or officials
for corrupt purposes. Id. at § 78dd-2(a)(2). Similar restrictions apply to issuers of securi-
ties pursuant to § 78dd-1.
35. McLaughlin, The Criminalization of Questionable Foreign Payments by Corpora-
tions: A Comparative Legal Systems Analysis, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1071, 1072 (1978).
The consequences of this disclosure included the removal of a Central American president
and a constitutional crisis in the Netherlands. Id.
36. Note, Corruption and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 13 MICH. J.L.
REFO 158, 162-63 (1979).
37. Id.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a), (d).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a). See also S. RE'. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12, reprinted
in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4098, 4109-10.
40. In 1978, the SEC had jurisdiction over approximately 9000 issuers and reporting
companies. See Note, A Congressional Response, supra note 33, at 1278.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d).
42. S. REP. No. 114, supra note 39, at 11-12, 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
4109-10.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d).
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civil injunction to prevent an anticipated violation. 4
Congress failed to address the act of state doctrine during its
deliberations on the FCPA. This failure is surprising, because effective
enforcement of the FCPA would seem to require courts to review for-
eign involvement in an alleged bribe. Presumably, Congress left the
relationship between the act of state doctrine and the FCPA to judicial
interpretation.
II
THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: CLA YCO
PETROLEUM CORP. v. OCCIDENTAL
PETROLEUM CORP.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
assessed the impact of the FCPA on an act of state defense to an anti-
trust claim based on corporate payments to foreign government offi-
cials abroad in Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.45
Clayco based its antitrust claims on allegations that Occidental made
secret payments totalling $417,000 to the Petroleum Minister of Umm
Al Qaywayn. 46 Clayco also asserted that, with these bribes, Occiden-
tal was able to secure a valuable off-shore oil concession, despite a
prior agreement between Clayco and Umm Al Qaywayn's ruler which
granted Clayco the concession. 47 Occidental moved to dismiss the
claim based on the act of state doctrine. The United States District
Court for the Central District of California granted Occidental's
motion, holding that proof of Clayco's claim would require the court
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c). Congress did not provide an express private right of action.
See 123 CONG. REc. 37,777 (1977) (statement of Rep. Samuel Devine, one of the conferees
who worked on the FCPA, made before the House unanimously adopted the conference
report). Although commentators have addressed the issue, see, e.g., Siegel, The Implication
Doctrine and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 79 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1085 (1979); Com-
ment, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Curse or Cure?, 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 73, 83 (1981);
Note, A Congressional Response, supra note 33, at 1288-92, no court has held that a private
right of action can be implied from the FCPA. Analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of
this Note; this Note assumes that no private right of action exists.
45. 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984). Clayco sued
Occidental for damages under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (prohibit-
ing contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade either among the several
states or with foreign nations), the Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(c) (1982) (prohibiting the payment or acceptance of anything of value by anyone
engaged in commerce, except for services rendered in connection with a sale or purchase),
the California Business and Professions Code, §§ 16720, 17045 (West 1964) (prohibiting
restraints on competition by "trusts" and secret payments which injure competitors and
tend to destroy competition), and common law. Clayco, 712 F.2d at 405. The court failed
to discuss Clayco's common law claims.
46. Clayco, 712 F.2d at 405. Umm Al Qaywayn is part of the United Arab Emirates.
Id. at 405 n.1.
47. Id. at 405.
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to review the propriety of the act of a foreign sovereign.48
Clayco appealed on the theory that the FCPA created a "corrup-
tion" exception to the act of state doctrine. 49 This contention rested
on two grounds. First, Clayco argued that the doctrine should not
apply in a private action against a bribing corporation because this
kind of action is consistent with Congress' goal of eliminating bribery
by American corporations abroad.50 Second, Clayco argued that
because the SEC had previously commenced an action against Occi-
dental regarding the bribes,51 there was no fear of further disclosure of
information potentially embarrassing to the foreign government.5 2
Thus, act of state concerns did not apply.53
The Ninth Circuit rejected Clayco's assertion of a bribery excep-
tion to the act of state doctrine.54 The court began its discussion with
quotes from Underhill v. Hernandez55 and Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino,5 6 emphasizing the separation of powers rationale and the
danger of judicial interference in foreign relations.5 7 The court
observed that neither the Supreme Court nor any court of appeals had
addressed the proposed bribery exception.58 Conceding that in enact-
ing the FCPA Congress intended to eliminate bribery overseas,5 9 the
court emphasized that FCPA enforcement "entails risks to our rela-
48. Id. at 406.
49. Clayco, 712 F.2d at 406. Appellants also argued that the act in issue was not a
sovereign act, that the necessary judicial inquiry would not be sufficiently intrusive to war-
rant act of state concerns, and that the commercial exception suggested in Alfred Dunhill
of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976), should be applied. Assuming the truth of the
underlying antitrust allegations, the court rejected each argument. First, the court held
that granting an oil concession is a sovereign act in that it affects the public interest. In the
cases presented by appellants, the sovereign activity merely formed a background to the
dispute. Clayco, 712 F.2d at 406-08. Second, the required analysis would be intrusive
because plaintiff's claim requires proof of bribery as the motivation for the sovereign act.
Embarrassment would therefore result from a judicial probe. Id. at 407. Finally, the com-
mercial exception suggested by a plurality of the Supreme Court in Dunhill envisioned
situations in which governments were not exercising powers peculiar to sovereigns. Grant-
ing an oil concession is peculiar to a sovereign. Id. at 408.
50. Id. at 408. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text for the legislative policies
supporting eliminating bribery.
51. Id. at 405. In 1977, the SEC commenced an action against Occidental alleging
illegal and questionable payments. Occidental consented to a permanent injunction and
agreed to conduct an internal investigation of the matter, a report of which was filed with
the SEC. Id.
52. Id at 409 n.6.
53. Id at 406.
54. Id at 409.
55. Id. at 406 (quoting Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252). See supra text accompanying note
11.
56. 712 F.2d at 406 (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423, 428). See supra text accompa-
nying note 15.
57. 712 F.2d at 406.
58. Id at 408 n.3. The court did mention two district court opinions which supported
the proposed exception. See infra note 81.
59. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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tions with the foreign government involved."' 60 But, the court distin-
guished governmental actions under the FCPA from private actions.
When the executive branch initiates an FCPA action, the Department
of State screens the proceedings to ensure conformity with foreign pol-
icy goals concerning the nation in question.61 The court concluded
that "in private suits, the act of state doctrine remains necessary to
protect the proper conduct of national foreign policy."'62
The court also rejected Clayco's contention that the SEC enforce-
ment action prior to Clayco's private action63 had already exposed all
the potentially embarrassing facts.64 The court stated that the SEC
action had disclosed only some of the facts concerning some of the
payments, but did not inquire into the reasons for granting the conces-
sion to Occidental. 65 As a result, the limited disclosure in the SEC
action did not eliminate the act of state concerns. To hear Clayco's
claim, the district court would have had to ascertain whether the con-
cession was granted in return for a bribe.66 This judicial finding of the




A. CLAYCO WAS CORRECTLY DECIDED
In Clayco, the Ninth Circuit focused on the separation of powers
rationale68 underlying the act of state doctrine as enumerated in Sab-
batino.69 The Clayco court declared, "[T]he critical element is the
potential for interference with our foreign relations. ' 70 This reasoning
justifies the Clayco decision; the risk of embarrassing or irritating for-
eign officials by examining their actions in a U.S. court is evident.71
60. Clayco, 712 F.2d at 408.
61. See Brief for Respondent at G-3, Clayco, 712 F.2d at 409. Daniel W. McGovern,
Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State, describes the screening process as notifi-
cation to the Department of State by the Department of Justice or the SEC. This permits
the Department of State to notify any affected foreign government in advance and to dis-
cuss any foreign relations concerns with the Department of Justice or the SEC. Id.
62. Clayco, 712 F.2d at 409.
63. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
65. Clayco, 712 F.2d at 409 n.6. The court did not elaborate on which facts were
disclosed. Presumably, if there was no inquiry into the reasons for granting the concession,
the SEC only investigated the actual bribe.
66. See id. at 409 n.6.
67. See id. at 404.
68. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
69. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
70. Clayco, 712 F.2d at 406.
71. Statements by businessmen and officials in the United Arab Emirates indicate that
such a risk arises from the inherent inference of impropriety associated with efforts of U.S.
1984]
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Commentators have argued that the acceptance of a bribe is not a
sovereign act and should not be protected by the act of state doc-
trine.72 The Fifth Circuit has adopted this position. Stating that "[ilt
is only when officials having sovereign authority act in an official
capacity that the Act of State Doctrine applies,"'73 the court held that
a dictator's illegal acts and receipt of money and securities with
knowledge of their unlawful origin were for private financial gain and
exceeded his official authority.74 As a result, the doctrine did not bar
his extradition. 75 In that case, however, the entire purported act of
state was not a sovereign act.
In Clayco, granting the oil concession can be separated from
accepting the bribe. Even if acceptance of the bribe were not consid-
ered an act of state, granting the oil concession would be. The court
could not confine its review to the bribe alone, because an award of
damages would have required proof of an antitrust violation, not
merely a bribe. The Ninth Circuit addressed this distinction between
the act of state and the related non-sovereign illegal acts in Occidental
Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co. 76 There, the plaintiff asked
the court to limit its review to the defendant's illegal actions in "cata-
lyzing" the act of state.77 The Ninth Circuit rejected this approach on
the grounds that an award of antitrust damages "requires proof of
damage resulting from forbidden conduct. ' 78 Such proof would force
the court to review the act of state induced by the defendant's conduct.
Similarly, in Clayco, the Petroleum Minister's acceptance of a bribe
corporations to comply with the FCPA. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-Oversight: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 297 (1982).
72. See, eg., McManis, Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad: An Antitrust
Approach, 86 YALE L.J. 215, 237 (1976). McManis argues that Dunhill, in suggesting a
commercial exception, creates a sovereign/non-sovereign dichotomy. Accepting a bribe is
a "non-sovereign" action.
73. Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 557 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied sub nom.
Jimenez v. Hixon, 373 U.S. 914 (1963).
74. Defendant dictator had unsuccessfully attempted to assert that his acts of embez-
zlement, fraud or breach of trust, and receipt of money or valuable securities with knowl-
edge of their unlawful origin were acts of state. The court found no legitimate act,
however, which could be considered an act of state. Id. at 557-58.
75. Id.
76. 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), ajflg 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 950 (1972). In affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated, "[T]he dismissal was correct.
We affirm for the reasons stated in the district court's opinion." 491 F.2d at 1261.
77. 331 F. Supp. at 110. The act of state involved was also the granting of an oil
concession.
78. 461 F.2d 1261, affig 331 F. Supp. at 110. The district court adopted the view that
Jimenez should be limited to the holding that "only. . . crimes committed by a chief of
state outside or in violation of his official authority are not acts of state." Occidental, 331
F. Supp. at 113.
[Vol. 17:407
1984] BRIBERY EXCEPTION TO ACT OF STATE
was not an act of state.79 The court could not have limited its inquiry
to Occidental's alleged bribes; a judgment for Clayco would have
required judicial review of the sovereign act of granting the oil
concession.
B. A PROPOSED BRIBERY EXCEPTION TO THE ACT OF STATE
DOCTRINE
Although the Ninth Circuit's application of the act of state doc-
trine was correct under the facts in Clayco, a bribery exception to the
doctrine is viable under other circumstances. The Clayco court
rejected the exception because the SEC action against Occidental did
not disclose the reasons for granting the oil concession.80 This leaves
open the possibility of a different result when U.S. enforcement agen-
cies have investigated the reasons behind the purported act of state.81
The act of state doctrine does not shield all actions of a foreign
sovereign from judicial scrutiny. The Supreme Court emphasized in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino 8 2 that the classic formulation of
the act of state doctrine is not "an inflexible and all-encompassing
rule."' 83 Recognition of the Bernstein exception 4 by the plurality in
First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba 8 5 indicates a will-
ingness on at least part of the Supreme Court to apply the doctrine
with the flexibility suggested in Sabbatino. An executive branch
FCPA investigation or prosecution that inquires into the reasons
behind a foreign sovereign's act should trigger a Bernstein-like excep-
79. Acceptance of a bribe by a foreign official is not an act of state because it is not an
official sovereign action in furtherance of the foreign nation's public interest. See supra
note 11. In Clayco, the act of state was the granting of an oil concession.
80. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
81. Dictum in Sage Int'l Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Mich.
1981), supports such an exception. In that case, the defendant tried to invoke the act of
state doctrine to bar the plaintiff's antitrust claim involving sham litigation and a conspir-
acy with foreign government personnel to receive illegal kickbacks. The court held the act
of state doctrine inapplicable because much of the alleged antitrust violation occurred
within the territory of the U.S. The plaintiff did not challenge the actions of the foreign
sovereign, which limited the potential for judicial interference with foreign relations. Id. at
908-09. The court suggested, however, that the act of state doctrine could also have been
avoided had the allegations called for "review of foreign sovereign corruption charges." Id.
at 910. Such corruption charges are analogous to a bribery allegation. Because the plaintiff
in Sage International did not allege wrongdoing by the foreign sovereign, the court
refrained from actually deciding this question. In support of the adoption of a corruption
exception, the court cited another district court opinion that declared in dictum, "[E]ven
an unrepudiated act of state may be scrutinized by the courts if it resulted from the corrup-
tion of government officials." Id. at 910 (quoting Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf &
Western Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)).
82. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
83. Id. at 428.
84. See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
85. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
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tion in a civil suit based upon the same. 86
1. Executive Branch Action Pursuant to the FCPA: An Implied
Waiver
A Bernstein letter from the executive branch informs the judiciary
that it need not apply the act of state doctrine in a particular case.87
This express waiver rebuts the doctrine's presumption that judicial
inquiry into the act of a foreign sovereign will interfere with the Exec-
utive's conduct of foreign policy.
An FCPA investigation or prosecution that reveals that an act of
state was induced by a bribe88 has the same effect as a Bernstein letter.
The executive branch enforces the FCPA through investigations,
injunctive suits, and criminal prosecutions.89 When the executive
branch conducts a thorough investigation under the FCPA, it neces-
sarily reviews the foreign sovereign's acts.90 A Bernstein letter
expressly permits a court to review these acts. 91 An FCPA action is,
in effect, an implied waiver of act of state concerns. Indeed, judicial
intervention following an FCPA action may be more justifiable from a
separation of powers standpoint than when there has been a Bernstein
letter. Although in such a letter the executive branch expressly per-
mits judicial review of a foreign state's acts, it is the judicial branch
which actually determines whether those acts were valid. In an FCPA
action, the executive branch determines the validity of the foreign
86. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 27, 31-32 and accompanying text.
88. This finding was absent in the Clayco case. See supra notes 63-65 and accompany-
ing text. One argument against viewing an FCPA action as a waiver of the act of state
doctrine in a civil antitrust suit is that in the civil suit, the plaintiff must establish a causal
link between the bribe and the antitrust violation. See supra text accompanying notes 72-
79. In an FCPA action, only proof of an intent to bribe for the purpose of retaining or
obtaining business is required. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Although this
argument is persuasive in theory, its practical impact is limited. First, in the case of an
FCPA prosecution, it seems inevitable that the question of whether the bribe had its alleged
intended effect would be raised. If the bribe did have this effect, the prosecution could
strengthen its case substantially by introducing this evidence. Dicta from Sage Interna-
tional supports this point:
[S]ince the Act imposes criminal sanctions for bribery "for the purposes of"
improper influence or inducement, it is inconceivable that a trial would proceed
without some inquiry into whether the alleged improper activity could have had
the intended effect, an examination that will call into question the operations of the
foreign entity to which the bribe was allegedly directed. The standards of proof in
a criminal action, particularly with respect to intent, would seem to require no less.
534 F. Supp. at 910 n.26. Second, in a civil suit, the court would review the investigation
or prosecution and require the plaintiff to show that the sovereign's acts had been examined
pursuant to an FCPA action. Such a showing would ensure that the executive action actu-
ally constituted a waiver.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
90. See supra note 88.
91. See supra notes 27, 31-32 and accompanying text.
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state's act. Subsequent judicial action in a civil suit would merely
adopt the determination by the executive branch that the foreign
state's acts were invalid.
2. The Bribery Exception Under the Bernstein Approach
The Bernstein court found that an executive branch waiver alone
justified disregarding the act of state doctrine. 92 According to the
"Bernstein approach," 93 the act of state doctrine is based solely on the
unimpaired conduct of foreign policy by the executive branch.94 The
plurality in First National City Bank, which adopted the Bernstein
exception, also saw executive authority as the basis of the act of state
doctrine:
It would be wholly illogical to insist that ... [the act of state doctrine,] fash-
ioned because of fear that adjudication would interfere with the conduct of
foreign affairs, be applied in the face of an assurance from that branch of the
Federal Government that conducts foreign relations that such a result would
not obtain. 95
An FCPA investigation similarly assures that the court's review will
not interfere with the conduct of foreign policy.96 Therefore, executive
branch action pursuant to the FCPA, exposing a bribe and its
intended effect, should operate as an exception to the act of state doc-
trine under the Bernstein approach.
3. The Bribery Exception Under the Sabbatino Test
The Sabbatino decision 97 implies that a Bernstein letter alone does
not enable a court to inquire into the validity of the act of a foreign
state. The "Sabbatino test," contrary to the Bernstein approach,98
rests upon the rationale that "the act of state doctrine is a judicial
92. Bernstein, 210 F.2d at 376. See supifa notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
93. This Note uses the term the "Bernstein approach," as opposed to the "Bernstein
exception," to include any executive branch waiver of act of state concerns. Under the
Bernstein exception, only a Bernstein letter operates as an executive branch waiver. See
supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text. The Bernstein approach is therefore broader
than the Bernstein exception in that an FCPA investigation may also operate as an execu-
tive branch waiver. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
The Bernstein approach can be distinguished from the Sabbatino test. See infra notes 97-
116 and accompanying text. Under the Bernstein approach, an executive branch waiver
alone permits judicial review of a foreign sovereign's acts. In contrast, the Sabbatino test
weighs various factors, including an executive branch waiver, to determine whether the act
of state doctrine applies.
94. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (REVISED), supra note 13, at § 428 com-
ment d ("The argument in favor of according deference to the Executive Branch is that
only that branch is in position to judge the potential for adverse effect on the conduct of
foreign relations of examination by a court of the validity of a foreign act.").
95. 406 U.S. at 769-70.
96. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
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doctrine for the guidance of the courts, and that the primacy of the
executive branch in foreign relations is but one of the bases for the
doctrine."99
Even under the more demanding Sabbatino test, courts should
allow an exception to the act of state doctrine. The court must con-
sider other factors100 in addition to the Executive's exclusive control in
foreign relations. The first additional factor is the degree of consensus
in international law on the objectionable nature of the foreign state's
act.101 There was no international consensus in Sabbatino concerning
the expropriation of an alien's property. 10 2
There is a consensus, however, on the impropriety of bribing for-
eign government officials.10 3 Thus, the illegality of bribery is a gener-
ally accepted principle of law recognized by all civilized nations.' °4
The consensus in international law is manifested in various resolutions
and agreements of the United Nations, 0 5 the Organisation of Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development, 0 6 the Organization of Ameri-
99. REsTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (REvISED), supra note 13, at § 428 com-
ment d (emphasis added).
100. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
101. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
102. 376 U.S. at 428-30 (1964). See also International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1361 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982)
(no consensus condemning cartels, royalties, and production agreements).
103. "In the course of the Gulf committee's investigation, we could not identify a single
country where a bribe of a government official to induce a government to enter into a
contract with any company for the supply of its product to that government was not illegal
in that country." Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings on S. 3133 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976) (statement of
John J. McCloy, former chairman, Gulf Special Review Committee, which investigated
Gulf's political contributions in the U.S. and abroad). For a list of bribery laws in 65
countries, see Note, Prohibiting Foreign Bribes: Criminal Sanctions for Corporate Payments
Abroad, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 231, 235-36 (1977).
104. STATUTE OF THE I.C.J. art. 38, para. 1(c).
105. Resolution Concerning Measures Against Corrupt Practices of Transnational and
Other Corporations, Their Intermediaries and Others Involved. U.N.G.A. Res. 3514
(XXX), 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 69-70, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1976). The resolu-
tion condemned all corrupt practices, with a specific reference to bribery, and requested
both home and host governments to take any necessary measures to prevent such corrupt
practices. Id. at points 1, 2. The resolution was adopted without vote. 1975 Y.B.U.N. 489.
The Committee on an International Agreement on Illicit Payments of the United Nations
Economic and Social Council composed a Draft International Agreement on Illicit Pay-
ments, completed in May 1979. 65 U.N. Doc. E/1979/104 (May 25, 1979), reprinted in 18
I.L.M. 1025, 1026 (1979). The drafters represented diverse geographical constituencies.
See Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. A Solution or a Problem?, 11 CAL. W.
INT'L. L.J. 111, 127 n.157 (1981). The Draft Agreement provides that the contracting
states shall make criminal the offering of payments to public officials and the receipt of
payments by public officials in connection with international commercial transactions. 65
U.N. Doc. E/1979/104, art. 1, 18 I.L.M. at 1026-27.
106. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development adopted its Decla-
ration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises. OECD Press Release A
(76) 20, at 83 (June 21, 1976), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 967 (1976). The Declaration stated
that multinational corporations should not render bribes, or be solicited or expected to
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can States, 10 7 and the International Chamber of Commerce. 10 8 The
standards in these resolutions and agreements by international organi-
zations also fulfill Sabbatino's requirement of standards from a treaty
or "other agreement." 10 9
Another criterion discussed in Sabbatino is the sensitivity of the
issue to national concerns. The act of state considered in Sabbatino,
the expropriation of an alien's property, 110 is accepted under the eco-
nomic and social systems of some nations and rejected under others.111
Reviewing the act of state would have required a choice between
opposing ideologies. These concerns do not apply to the bribery of
foreign government officials, which is condemned universally. 112
The final consideration' 13 under Sabbatino involves judicial
abstention when the executive branch alone can redress the grievances
of a U.S. citizen harmed by the act of state. Again, this concern was
appropriate in Sabbatino, in which the Supreme Court adjudged an
expropriation claim. 14 In that case, the executive branch could nego-
tiate a settlement with the foreign sovereign through diplomatic chan-
nels. 115 In a bribery situation, however, the defendant is a private
enterprise or an individual, not a sovereign. Diplomatic negotiation is
not a viable option. Therefore, redress through the courts is most
appropriate. The adoption of a bribery exception to the act of state
render bribes, to any holder of public office. Annex, General Policies, point 7, 15 I.L.M. at
972.
107. The Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) unani-
mously adopted a Resolution on the Behavior of Transnational Enterprises on July 10,
1975. OAS CP/Res. No. 154 (167/75), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1326 (1975). The OAS
resolved to condemn bribery by a transnational corporation as well as the acceptance of
such payments by any person. The Council also urged governments of member states to
clarify their laws with respect to such acts. Id., 14 I.L.M. at 1328.
108. The International Chamber of Commerce adopted the report of its Commission on
Ethical Practices, Extortion and Bribery in Business Transactions, on November 29, 1977.
ICC Pub. No. 315 (1977), reprinted in 17 I.LM.k 417 (1978). The report recommended that
governments affirm their commitment against bribery and draft an international agreement
to facilitate the elimination of corruption, iad pt. II, § I, 17 I.L.M. at 418, and declared that
no enterprise may give a bribe to retain business and that a demand for such a bribe must
be rejected. Id. Basic Rules, art. 2, 17 I.L.M. at 420.
109. The phrase "other agreement" is subject to interpretation. The court did not define
"other agreement" and its meaning is unclear. This Note adopts a broad interpretation of
the phrase that includes resolutions and guidelines of international organizations.
110. See supra note 12.
111. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 430.
112. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
113. Technically, there is an additional consideration: the existence of the foreign gov-
ernment and U.S. recognition of it. See supra note 19. In a bribery situation, application of
all the other Sabbatino test factors support an exception to the act of state doctrine. See
supra notes 100-12 and accompanying text. Therefore, the "existence and recognition"
factor alone is insufficient to warrant application of the doctrine.
114. See supra note 12.
115. See Falk, The Complexity of Sabbatino, supra note 12, at 939-45, for a more
detailed application of the factors of this test to the Sabbatino case.
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doctrine would enable private parties damaged by bribery in an anti-
trust setting to satisfy their claims in court.
The proposed bribery exception is consistent with the Sabbatino
test. The addition of the Sabbatino factors beyond the implied waiver
by the executive branch 16 does not affect the conclusion that the act
of state doctrine should not apply to bribery of foreign officials. Thus,
even the more rigorous Sabbatino test supports the proposed bribery
exception to the act of state doctrine.
4. Policy Supporting a Bribery Exception
Judicial recognition of a bribery exception to the act of state doc-
trine would aid in enforcement of the FCPA.1 17 Although many
investigations have been conducted under the FCPA, there have been
very few prosecutions. The Department of Justice attributes this to
the "immense practical difficulty in gathering evidence necessary to
build a case under difficult circumstances in foreign countries." 118
The bribery exception should lead to the prosecution of more viola-
tors. If a company is harmed by a competitor's bribe to a foreign gov-
ernment official, the damaged company is likely to provide helpful
information to the SEC or the Department of Justice if a civil action
following the FCPA action will be unencumbered by the act of state
doctrine.
Treble damages awarded to a successful antitrust plaintiff would
serve as a powerful incentive to provide evidentiary assistance in the
FCPA action. This would aid the executive branch in the enforcement
of law and the administration of justice, help fulfill the congressional
goal of eliminating overseas bribery by domestic corporations, com-
pensate injured parties, and prevent wrongdoers from reaping unjust
rewards.
CONCLUSION
The Clayco decision is sound within the parameters of its factual
situation. The relevant foreign policy considerations required that the
act of state doctrine preclude Clayco's claim. The policies underlying
the FCPA and the flexible application of the act of state doctrine,
however, provide the foundations for a bribery exception to the doc-
trine, given that an FCPA action has inquired into the alleged act of
state. The exception would further the legislative intent to eliminate
116. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
117. In 1978, just one year after passage of the FCPA, the SEC was investigating over
400 cases which were opened following that agency's voluntary disclosure program. SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 466, at A-4 (Aug. 16, 1978).
118. I. (Statement of Mark Richard, Dep't of Justice).
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bribery by Americans overseas. A bribery exception also meets the
standards for exceptions to the act of state doctrine under both the
Bernstein approach and the more stringent Sabbatino test. Businesses
that violate the FCPA should not be permitted to hide behind the
cloak of the act of state doctrine in a civil suit after the executive
branch has already linked an illegal payment with a foreign sover-
eign's acts. Disregard of the act of state doctrine in such a situation
would be "no more than an application of the classical common-law
maxim that '[t]he reason of the law ceasing, the law itself also
ceases. "119
Joel Simon
119. First Nat'l City Bank, 406 U.S. at 768 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 228
(4th ed. 1951)).

